SAFETY
(Kyodo) _ The airline industry and the transport
ministry are trying to overhaul their safety systems in the wake
of a recent series of blunders involving commercial airplanes, many
of them deriving from human error, but finding a quick solution to
them is not easy.
At least 13 of about 20 major problems that were revealed this year
resulted from errors by pilots, cabin attendants and mechanics, creating
fears among passengers of a major accident, such as the one in which
a Japan Airlines jumbo jet crashed in the mountains of Gunma Prefecture
in 1985, killing 520 people in the worst single-aircraft disaster
in history.
"Flight crew have become nervous, fearful of repeating any blunder,
but such a tense atmosphere is unhealthy as that could trigger other
mistakes," Ken Mamba, a 43-year-old JAL captain, said.
None of the recent problems resulted in severe injuries to passengers.
But safety problems are serious, particularly at JAL, in view of
the fact that blunders have been continuing even after the airline
worked out a set of safety measures in response to a March 17 government
order for operational improvements.
On Jan. 22, for example, a JAL pilot tried to leave New Chitose Airport
in Hokkaido without obtaining permission for take-off from air traffic
controllers, thinking he had already received it.
JAL flight attendants also forgot to perform safety procedures for
emergency evacuation on March 16.
On June 5, an All Nippon Airways plane flew at an altitude 1,600
meters higher than instructed by air traffic controllers, a case
which is believed to have been caused by a number of factors: a malfunctioning
altimeter, an erroneous assumption by the captain and the failure
of maintenance staff to give the captain proper guidance.
Air traffic controllers were not immune from error. In April, two
planes were guided to land on a closed runway at Tokyo's Haneda airport
when all 18 controllers on duty forgot it was closed.
Airplane experts and front-line workers, however, say JAL and ANA
have experienced similar human error-induced blunders in the past,
attesting to the lack of efforts both by the government and the airline
industry to seriously tackle the human factor issue.
"Same kinds of trouble are repeated because the root of the
problem is not eliminated," said Tomoki Kuwano, a former JAL
captain who now serves as director of the Human Error Laboratory
at the Japan Institute of Human Factors.
Human factors being studied in the airline industry are wide-ranging
and include training, aircraft design and corporate management systems.
Research in the field has been drawing increasing attention from
the global commercial aviation industry since the 1970s as studies
show human-derived problems, rather than mechanical glitches, have
been responsible for many airline accidents, said Kuwano.
Flight crew were primarily responsible for 62 percent of worldwide
commercial jet airplane accidents resulting in hull losses between
1959 and 2003, according to a statistical summary published by Boeing
Commercial Airplanes.
But Kuwano believes the share of problems associated with humans
is larger than the 62 percent because the remaining causes cited,
such as airplane problems, also may have involved errors by mechanics
or aircraft designers.
The 64-year-old former captain, however, says problems stemming from
human error should not be reduced to the failures of particular individuals.
"In Japanese society, people often tend to sum up certain problems
as resulting from an individual's personal deficiencies, such as
his or her lack of safety awareness, but in many cases mistakes occur
despite individuals doing their best, and other factors lie behind
the trouble," he said.
An official of a JAL labor union suggested that JAL flight attendants
should not be solely blamed for failing to perform the procedures
for emergency evacuation, saying the company did not take any prompt
action despite complaints by flight attendants that the procedures
had become misleading after they were revised in February.
The company later modified the procedures to the original version.
"A similar case may not happen again, but that does not mean
other problems will not happen, as long as the company maintains
its attitude of not listening to what workers say."
Kuwano said Japanese companies are generally reluctant to give serious
consideration to solving problems related to human factors because
this would significantly affect the company's management policies,
such as streamlining programs aimed to cut costs.
In June, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport set up
a panel of experts within the Civil Aviation Bureau to discuss measures
related to human error and the government's surveillance of airline
operators. It will compile a report by the end of August.
Some analysts and airline workers, however, doubt the panel can be
independent enough to delve into ministry affairs, such as its deregulation
policy, said to be undermining the safety of Japan's aircraft.
Meanwhile, a Tokyo-based engineering and research organization has
been calling for the government to take steps to encourage aviation
employees to submit reports on safety issues on a voluntary basis,
such as any problems they feel may lead to serious accidents, as
a way of promoting information-sharing within the industry.
The Association of Air Transport Engineering and Research provides
a database on safety information. It receives some 60 reports a year
from domestic airline companies but an official says cases reported
to the association are just the tip of the iceberg.
"Understanding small risk factors would lead to a deeper analysis
of Japan's aviation system," Shozo Hirose, general manager of
the association's Engineering Department, said.
The government should establish a legal framework in which an individual
airline employee would be immune from administrative penalties for
disclosing blunders under certain conditions, he said, referring
to the United States and South Korea.
In the face of criticism from the public, airline companies have
started to take additional steps.
ANA has launched a "communication project" at its flight
operation division in the wake of the case in which one of its planes
flew at the wrong altitude.
ANA has been training its flight crew to enable them to work as a
team and improve communications and decision-making. But Shinichi
Inoue, senior vice president of Flight Operations, admitted the training
did not work effectively when the plane took the wrong-altitude course.
JAL, admitting that it "lacked awareness of safety," held
a total of 220 emergency safety meetings in April and May to promote
interaction between management and employees.
As Japanese airline companies struggle to recover passengers' trust
in their operations, some workers and labor union members remain
pessimistic.
JAL should feel a deeper sense of crisis about its safety problems,
a JAL employee and former mechanic said, recalling that such a sense
was more acute at the airline following the 1985 crash.
Masahiro Takeshima, vice-secretary general of the Japan Federation
of Aviation Workers' Unions, said, "The company seems to have
forgotten what it learned from that accident, and I am afraid that
airline companies will soon forget about what they have learned from
the recent safety warnings."
