SAFETY
Yet again, crew behaviour and training is a headline issue
- I refer to the China Eastern Airbus A340 "serious tailscrape"
(Flight International, 19-25 April).
How can a major airline create Cockpit Ressources Management (or
lack of) that allows a commander to continue a flight after a tailscrape
- contravening all known safety culture practice? Any suggestion
of airframe damage, notably the air traffic control warning, should
see an immediate return.
In deciding to continue, how did this crew know that there was no
damage to the pressure bulkhead or to the structural integrity of
the airframe? How did they know that in the ensuing flight of at
least 11h, a damage resultant failure and consequent explosive decompression would
not take place? Who decided to pressurise the hull on the climb out?
Why was the operations manual ignored?
The cited nose pitching (VR+), and the cause thereof is an issue
on its own - could this be the Airbus primary flight display cursor/control
debate again?
What does the decision to continue tell us about the vagaries of
training, culture, cockpit ressource management and flight safety?
Meanwhile, luck has yet again saved the day.
Lance Cole
Swindon, Wiltshire, UK
